Abstract-In this paper we provide a quantum public-key cryptosystem based on super dense coding technology. A user Alice shares a set of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs with a key management center (KMC) in which the particles hold by Alice are the private key and the particle hold by KMC are the public key. By the help of the key management center any other user can send encrypted message to Alice. Any one including KMC except Alice can't recover the message. On the other hand digital signature can also be achieved by this public-key cryptosystem. In the cryptosystem one EPR pair can be used to encrypt two bits of the plain text. So it's efficient. Finally we prove that our cryptosystem is robust against possible attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography can help people to exchange secret information through an insecure channel. The original information to be submitted is called "the plain text". It is integrated with some auxiliary information which called "the key" to produce the encrypted information which is called "the cipher text". Then the cipher text can be transmitted though an unsecure channel. No one can recover the plain text except the authenticated user who has the key. Two users sharing the key can perform secret communications though there is only an insecure quantum channel between them. Obviously key distribution is the precondition for people to achieve secret communication. In classical cryptography it is the most difficult problem. In fact there are nearly no unconditionally secure classical key distribution protocols.
There is a good way to solve this problem: quantum key distribution protocol. In QKD protocols we need insecure quantum channel and an authenticated public classical channel. The laws of quantum physics guarantee that the protocols can be unconditionally secure. C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard provided the first quantum key distribution protocol in 1984 [1] . Then people developed many quantum key distribution protocols [2~10] . On the other hand experimental work for OKD has also succeeded. In 1992 Bennett, Bessette and Brassard first realized BB84 protocol in laboratory [11] . QKD in optical fiber has been achieved beyond 150 km [12] and in free space has been implemented over a distance of 1 km [13] .
As known there are two kinds of cryptographic algorithms: symmetrical algorithms and asymmetrical algorithms. In asymmetrical algorithm encryption and decryption use the same key which is shared by the two parts involved in communication. If many users want to communicate with each other, key management will become very difficult. If there are N users in a cryptosystem, one user must share a key with every one of the other users. So every user must keep N-1 keys secret and remember which user they belong to, which needs the user to pay much cost. Moreover all the N(N-1)/2 key must be distributed before the cryptosystem begins to work. Obviously it's too tedious and too complex if N is a large number! On the other hand maybe the N users don't trust each other. So they can't establish shared key at all, which makes that the crypto-system can't work from the beginning. In cryptography a solution to overcome such difficulties is public-key cryptosystem, for example, RSA algorithm [14] . In public-cryptosystem every user has a pair of keys which are called the public key and the private key respectfully. The cipher text encrypted by the public key can only be decrypted by the private key while cipher text encrypted by the private key can only be decrypted by the public key. Moreover the public key and the private key are independent from each other, that is to say, it's impossible to deduce one key from the other. All users' public keys are kept by a key management center (KMC) in which they are open to every user. Every user keeps his or her private key secret so as that no other one can get it. When a user Alice wants to send a secret message to another user Bob, she first asks KMC for Bob's public key. The she encrypts the message by the public key and sends the encrypted message (named "the cipher text") to Bob. When Bob receives the cipher text, he decrypts the cipher text using his private key. Finally Bob gets the plain text. Any eavesdropper who catches the cipher text can't recover the plain text because he or she has no Bob's private key. Today public-key cryptosystem has been widely used in modern society, which provides secure communications for military affairs, commercial affairs, government affairs and network transmissions. But as known Peter Shor found a quantum polynomialtime algorithm to RSA algorithm in 1994 [15] . So the classical public-key cryptosystem based on RSA algorithm will become unsafe in future if quantum computers are put into use. Quantum public-key cryptosystem may replace classical public-key cryptosystem to bring us security on future quantum computers. In 2001 Gottesman presented a quantum oneway function in his quantum digital signature protocol [16] , which may be heuristic in quantum public-key crypto-system. A similar scheme was provided in [17] . In 2008 Nikolopoulos found the first unconditionally secure quantum public-key scheme [18] . It is based on singleparticle rotation of unknown quantum states. Since then a few public-key schemes have been provided [19] [20] [21] [22] .
In this paper we provide a quantum public-key cryptosystem based on super dense coding technology. Users and KMC share EPR pairs as the public key and the private key. With the help of KMC, N users can communicate with each other securely. Moreover digital signature for message can be fulfilled naturally by the public-key cryptosystem. One EPR pair can be used to encrypt two bits of the message. So it's efficient. We prove that the cryptosystem is secure against possible attack.
II. BASIC IDEA
In quantum information science a quantum two-state particle is often called a qubit. A two-qubit system can be in one of the four Bell states
Such a two-qubit system is often called an EPR pair. It's easy to find that the four Bell states forms a complete orthogonal basic vector set in which people can measure a two-qubit system. Such measurement is called the Bell state measurement which has been carried out [23] . As known we can perform one of the four operations in {I,
Now we assume that Alice and Bob share an EPR pair in the state 
Then Alice shares the EPR pairs with KMC in which qubit 1 of the EPR pair is hold by Alice and qubit 2 is bold by KMC. The qubits sequence hold by Alice is called Alice's private key while the qubits sequence hold by KMC is called Alice's public key. The public key is open to every user while Alice keeps her private key secret in order that no one except herself can get it. Now another user, such as Bob, wants to send a secret message to Alice. The message may be a 2n-bit string denoted P which we call the plain text. First Bob splits the 2n bits into n two-bit blocks. To encrypt the plain text to the cipher text, Bob asks KMC for Alice's public key. After getting the qubit sequence, he encrypts the plain text according to the following Encoding Rule.
Encoding Rule:
If the block is '00', Bob do nothing; if the block is '01', Bob performs a x It's easy to find that each qubit 2 of the EPR pair is used to encrypt a two-bit block. Then Bob sends the qubit sequence to Alice. When Alice receives the qubits, to each EPR pair she put the qubit 2 she received together with the qubit 1 at her hands. Next Bob performs the Bell state on the EPR pairs and records according to the Key Rule. Finally Alice gets a 2n-bit string denoted as P'. Obviously we have P'=P, or in other words, Alice gets the plain text that Bob wants to send her. In section 4 we will prove that by a well-designed scheme no one except Alice and Bob can get the plain text. So the communication process between Bob and Alice is secure.
There is still a problem left. The public key, or in other words, the n-qubit sequence is consumed after a communication process. So does the private key. The pair of keys can be used for only one time. If all the N-1 users want to send secret message to Alice, KMC must preserve at least N-1 public keys for Alice. In practice a user maybe needs to communicate with Alice for many times. So we can assume that KMC should keep M(M>>N) public key for Alice. So does every user in our cryptosystem. In order to discriminate the M public keys of Alice, every public key should be given a unique id number.
So we can design a feasible public-key cryptosystem based on this idea.
III. QUANTUM PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM USING BASED ON SUPER DENSE CODING TECHNOLOGY
Now we present our quantum public-key cryptosystem.
A. Building the Public-key Cryptosystem
First we assume that there are N users and a KMC in our public-key cryptosystem. They can communicate with each other through a classical channel and a quantum channel. Both the two channels are insecure which everyone can listen to. But the classical channel is authenticated so that one user can assure that the classical information he receives is really from the counterpart. KMC is trusted by every user while any two users don't trust each other. Every user creates M (M>>N) EPR pairs and shares with KMC in which the first qubit (qubit 1) is hold by user himself and the second qubit (qubit 2) is hold by KMC. So the public keys is denoted as (6) in which i Q is an n-qubit sequence and i is the id number.
On the other hand, the user keeps her private keys denoted as
All users' public keys are open to everyone, in other words, any user can asks KMC for any public key of any other user. But one public key can only be given to one user because it will be consumed and no longer exist. At the same time every user must keep his or her private keys absolutely secret. Similarly one private key can also be used for one time.
B. Process of the Secret Communication
If a user Bob wants to send a secret message denoted as a 2n-bit string P to another user Alice, they perform the following steps.
Step 1: Bob asks KMC for one of Alice's public keys.
Step 2: KMC chooses a public key ) , ( j Q j from Alice's PU K at random and gives it to Bob.
Step 3: After receiving the public key, Bob gets the id number j and sends it to Alice through the classical channel.
Step 4: After receiving the id number j, Alice queries it in her PR K and gets the corresponding private key ) , ( j R j in order to decrypt the cipher text received.
Step Alice performs the Bell state measurement on them and records according to Key Rule. Finally Alice will get a string P'. Obviously we have P'=P. So Alice gets the message which Bob sends her. If Alice wants to send secret message to Bob, they need only exchange the roles in the process above. So any two users can achieve secret communications by our public-key cryptosystem.
C. Digital Signature
First all users agree to the following rule.
Signature Rule:
If the measurement result is |0>, we records it as "0"; If the measurement result is |1>, we records it as "1".
If Bob sends a secret message P' to Alice, he can sign the message to prove his identity to Alice. What Bob needs to do is to attach a classical message (the signed message) with the original message that he wants send to Alice. To produce the signed message, Bob performs as following steps.
Step 1: Bob produces an m-bit abstract PA from P' which he wants to send Alice by a hash algorithm, such as SHA-1 algorithm.
Step 2 Step 3: Bob performs XOR operation between PA and PK. Finally he gets an m-bit string PS which is just the signed message.
Step 4: Bob attaches PS and the id number k with P'. So he gets a string P which is the plain text to be submitted to Alice.
Notice that now the length of P should be 2n. So the length of the original message P' added with the length of k should be 2n-m. If P can't satisfy it, we can always make it by dividing it into several parts or adding supplementary bits.
Then Bob and Alice can finish the communication as the steps in section III.
After Alice gets the plain text, she can extract the original message P, the signed message PS and the id number k. To verify the signature, she does as the following steps.
Step 1: Alice asks KMC for Bob's no. k public key k Q .
Step 2: After receive k
. Then she takes the first m measurement results and records according to Signature Rule. Finally she gets an m-string PK' which is just equals to PK.
Step 4: Alice performs XOR operation between PK' and PS. So she gets an m-bit string PA'.
Step 5: Alice produces the abstract PA of P' by SHA-1 algorithm just as Bob does.
Step 6: Alice compare PA' and PA. If they are same, the verification succeeds. Alice can be sure that the message is just from Bob.
IV. SECURITY OF THE PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM
Our public-key cryptosystem is secure. Two users can communicate with each other secretly. Any other people including KMC can not get the message. We prove it as follows.
Let's assume that an eavesdropper, for example, Eve, wants to get the message transmitted from Bob to Alice.
A. Impossibility for Eavesdroppesr to Get theMessage
Eve may listen to both the classical channel and the quantum channel, trying to get the message from Bob to Alice. She can get the n-qubit sequence ' j Q sent from Bob to Alice in step 5. On the other hand, she also knows that the plain text is encrypted by no. j public key. But she can't get the message P that Bob wants to send Alice at all because the message is encoded not in the states of the qubits of . That is to say, Eve can't get any information about the EPR pair's state. The probability that she get a two-bit block of the message P is no more than 1/4. There are n blocks in P, so we have the probability for Eve to get P is (9) which can be rewritten as we have the same conclusion. So Alice is sure to find Eve's existing. On the other hand Eve can only get |0> or |1> with equal probability 1/2 which contains no information about the message from Bob to Alice. So the strategy of entanglement attack can't succeed.
B. Impossibility for KMC to Get theMessage
It's easy to prove that KMC can't get message that Bob sends to Alice even though it keeps the public keys and join in the communications process. Alice's public key is a qubit sequence in which every qubit belongs to an EPR pair in the state > Φ + | . KMC holds all the public key of Alice. But the other qubit of each EPR pair, or in other words, the private key, is kept by Alice which no one can get it including KMC. So KMC can't get the EPR pairs and perform the Bell state measurement to get the message just as Alice does.
On the other hand KMC may also take strategy of entanglement attack. To each qubit (denoted qubit 2) in j Q , KMC creates an auxiliary qubit (named qubit K) performs CNOT operation on the composed system of qubit 2 and qubit E in which qubit 2 is the control qubit and qubit K is the target qubit. As known the state of the EPR pair is > Φ + | , the state of the whole three-qubit system turns into 
When Alice received qubit 2 and performs the Bell state measurement on the EPR pair in step 6, she will get
with equal probability 1/2. Or in other words, the message sent from Bob is damaged. So Alice can find that someone is cheating. On the other hand if KMC measures qubit K, it can only get |0> or |1> with equal probability 1/2 which contains no information about the message from Bob to Alice. So we have the same conclusion that the entanglement attack also fails.
C. Impossibility for Eavesdropper to Distort the Message
We prove that the Eve can't distort the secret message from Bob to Alice. Eve may catch the qubit sequence Eve doesn't know. So Eve can't know what the state of the EPR pair is after she performs any operation. That is to say, she can't make the EPR pair turns into a state which she wants it to be. This makes it impossible for Eve to make Alice to get a measurement result which she wanted Alice to get. In fact Eve can only choose to perform an operation at random with a wish that the state EPR chances to turn to the state she wants it to be. The probability for one EPR pair is 
There are n EPR pairs. So the probability which Eve achieves her goal for all the EPR pairs is 
That is to say, such attack also fails.
D. Impossibility for KMC to distort the Message
We can prove that the KMC can't distort the secret message from Bob to Alice, too. KMC may also catch the qubit sequence ' j Q from Bob to Alice and try to produce a fake message to Alice. It's obvious that KMC encounter the same problem as Eve does. It's impossible for KMC to make the EPR pair to turn into a state which it hopes because KMC doesn't know the state of the EPR pair after Bob finishes encoding. So KMC can't make Alice to get the measurement result which it wants whatever it does. Or in other words, KMC can't make Alice to accept a fake message.
On the other hand KMC may try to produce a distort message by providing fake public key to Bob. We can prove that such attack can't succeed, either. First KMC produces a fake public key the Bell state measurement in step 6, she can only get random measurement results which contain no information. It's impossible for KMC to make Alice to get the distort message that it wants Alice to get. So KMC can't succeeds in cheating.
E. Security against Forward Search Attack
In classical public-key cryptosystem, how to defeat forward search attack is an important problem which can't be ignored. The forward search attack can be described as follows. Since Alice's public key is kept by KMC, every user who wants to sends message to Alice must ask KMC for Alice's public key. All cipher texts are encrypted by Alice's public key. So Eve may encrypt many plain texts by Alice's public key to produce many cipher texts and save them in her database. Then Eve catches all cipher texts sent to Alice and queries them in her database. If she just finds that a cipher text which a user sends to Alice is the same as one cipher text in her database, she can conclude that the plain text which the user wants to send Alice is just the plain text she used to produce the cipher text in her database. Finally Eve gets the secret message transmitted to Alice. But in our quantum public-key cryptosystem, forward search attack is meaningless because Alice has many public keys in which a public key can be used only one time. Encrypting the same plain texts by different public keys of course produces different cipher texts.
So forward search attack is sure to be unsuccessful. This is a big advantage of our public-key system.
F. Security of Digital Signature
Finally we prove that our cryptosystem can solve digital signature problem, too. How does Alice assure that the message is really from Bob? If Eve wants to impersonate Bob, she must produce signed message to cheat Alice. It's easy for Eve to produce the abstract PA from the message she wants to send Alice by SHA-1 algorithm. But Eve doesn't know Bob's private key at all which it's necessary to produce the signed message PS. Since Bob keeps his private key secret, what Eve can do is only to guess PK. So the probability for Eve to guess correctly for all the m bit of PK is
If m=100, we have 30 100 10 2
It's such a small probability. So Eve has no chances to cheat Alice successfully. Or in other words, Alice can assure that the message is from Bob. So we can say that our public-key cryptosystem provides a reliable signature method.
G. Security against Resend Attcak
In classical public-key cryptosystem, Eve may take the strategy of resend attack. She can catch the message sent form Bob to Alice and make a copy of it. Then she resends the message after some time, for example two days or two months. Obviously Alice has no means to percept such attack because the message is indeed from Bob. So Eve can make Alice to receive an outdated and repeated message although Eve doesn't know the message at all. To solve this problem, people should add timestamp to the original plain text so as Alice can find that the message is outdated. Obviously users have to pay more cost to producing and verifying timestamp.
In our quantum public-key cryptosystem, resend attack is not a threat at all. 
H. Security against Chosen Plain Text Attack
Our public-key cryptosystem is secure under chosen plain text attack. We prove it as follows.
In a chosen plain text attack, Eve is allowed to obtain a random number (plain text, cipher text) pairs of her choice. Then she tries to find some information about the key. In classical cryptography chosen plain text attack is a power tool to crash the cryptographic system if the number is large enough. But in our public-key cryptosystem the public key can be used for only one time. Different cipher texts are produced by different public keys. So there are no correlations between them. Eve can't find any laws which can help her to find something about the key. Although Eve may get as many as possible (plain text, cipher text) pairs, she is still unable to get anything helpful to break our public-key cryptosystem. So chosen plain text attack is invalid to our public-key cryptosystem. Now we have proved that our public-key cryptosystem is unconditionally secure.
V. FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM
First our public-key cryptosystem isn't an imaginary plan based on the technology which doesn't existT now T or the technology difficult to carry out. All that the users need to do are performing the Bell state measurement on an EPR pair, performing operation on a qubit and transmitting qubits through a quantum channel, which have been all realized in laboratory for a long time. So it is easier to carry out in practice.
Second as known quantum cryptography depends on the special properties of quantum system. But in practice quantum systems often undergo decoherence over time which makes them to lose quantum coherence and to turn into classical systems inevitably. It's the most important problem for quantum cryptographic protocol to work in practice. Especially in public-key cryptosystem, KMC needs to keep all users' public keys which are just quantum systems for some time until a user asks for them. This brings a serious challenge for public-key cryptosystem. To overcome this difficulty, we can use the quantum system which has bigger time length of decoherence, such as photon in Single-mode fiber. On the other hand users can update their public keys periodically. By means of such methods, our cryptosystem can perform well to satisfy all users. Third all that above discussions are based on that Alice and Bob always using noiseless channels to build a key in our protocol. If there are no noiseless channels, can this protocol work? We can study it, too. Let's consider noisy classical channel first. In step 3, Bob sends the id number j to Alice, which is necessary to the next step. If there errors in transmission, Bob is sure to fail. Fortunately classical error-correcting coding technology has been a mature and powerful system. We can fulfill information transmission through a noisy classical channel with very low error rate by error-correcting coding, which guarantees the classical information correct between Alice and Bob.
On the other hand, in step 6 Bob sends the qubit sequence ' j Q to Alice through the quantum channel. If there are random errors existing, Alice will get mistaken bits, which also means communication failure. The solution is error-correcting coding, too. Although quantum error-correcting coding technology is not as mature as classical error-correcting coding technology, it can provide rather satisfying results for most quantum channel.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have pointed out that a public key can be used for only one time in our cryptosystem. This limits the number of user. If KMC keeps M public keys for Alice, M users can send message to Alice at most. If one user needs to communicate with Alice for many times, the number who can exchange information with Alice will be further depressed. Such limit can be removed by developing cryptosystem in which public key can be reused. We will discuss it in future work.
In this paper we provide a quantum public-key cryptosystem based on super dense coding technology. N users can achieve secret communications by the help of a key manage center. The principles of quantum mechanics guarantee that our cryptosystem is unconditionally secure. No one except the two parts involved in communication can get the message. The message can be signed so that the sender's identity can be verified. One qubit in the public key can be used to encrypt two bits of classical information. So our cryptosystem is efficient. Moreover it is more secure against possible attacks.
